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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
H. L. ALLRED, DeVON J. McKEE,
ORIN (HANK) SWAIN, JOSEPH
WILCKEN, and ORLAN COOK,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

Case No.
8867

U N I 0 N S E E D COMPANY and
WAYNE MALIN,
Defendants,
UNION SEED COMPANY,
Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
Throughout respondents' brief, interpretation of the
evidence is made as establishing certain facts and conclusions drawn from the interpretation. Such interpretation
and conclusions cannot logically be drawn from the evidence. We therefore desire to call the Court's attention to
some of these by reply brief, making due reference to pages
of respondents' brief.
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ARGUMENT
On Page 3, of respondents' brief, it is stated that th1
seed would be run through the "Clipper" at Malin's ware
house before grade samples obtained. The fact is the "Clip
per" would only be used occasionally when the deliverec
seed was exceptionally dirty. In most instances, the samplE
was sent to Union Seed Company for grade and price with.
out "Clippering" (Tr. Page 25 and 26).
On Page 4, of respondents' brief, (3rd paragraph)
respondents state "Because of the fact that the grower~
often needed money before they were willing to accept~
particular market price, they customarily accepted advanCE
sums of money from Appellant".
It is a fact that Appellant authorized advances whell
the seed was in the field. There is not a scintilla of evidenCE
that an advance was authorized, or known of, by the Appel.
lant, when the grower was unwilling to accept the offered
price. Indeed, the Trial Court found that Malin had nc
authority to even store seed for the Appellant when offer·
ing price was rejected by grower (Finding of Fact No. 15).
Further, the only growers who refused the offered priCE
are those growers named in Appellant's Brief, Point 3 B.
On Pages 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, Respondents attempt to com·
partmentize the transactions into 5 compartments. Compartment 5, on Page 10, of Respondents' brief obviousl~
has nothing to do with the case, since payment of commis·
sions to the agent, is of no concern to respondents.
The other four categories are merely an analysis oj
types of payments, attempting to establish respondents
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theory that title did not pass until payment in full to the
grower had been made. Respondents make numerous references throughout their brief to advances made before
delivery. In every such instance, delivery of specified goods
in specified quantity was subsequently made and a price
quoted. We have not taken the position that title passed
before delivery. Hence, such arguments confuse rather
than clarify the issues in this case.
Any advance made before grade analyses were received
by Malin, could not show the price, because price was based
on purity established by the analyses at Union Seed Company's plant. The price and quantity was reflected in later
drafts.
In this case, regardless of whether an advance or partial payment was made, every grower delivered to the agent
a specified number of bags or pounds of seed, received a
grade on all seed shipped to Appellant, (See Complaint
R : Pages 2, 3 and 4) and the grade determined the price
quoted. This price was quoted to the grower, and when
accepted, the seed shipped to Appellant. That these sales
were made in this manner was established by Counsel on
direct examination of the Agent. After interrogating the
witness as to the procedure on these purchases, these questions were asked: (Tr. Page 34, line 17).
"Q. Having been authorized in that manner,
you would go out and make a bid on it?
"A. That is right.
"Q. If you were successful in purchasing it,
you would fill out that Country Loading Report and
ship it up to Burley?
"A. Yes.
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"Q. And on the seed that actually went to Bu1
ley to the Union Seed Company, it was all handle
in that fashion?
"A. Yes." (Italics added.)

The Court should note that not one grower testified t
challenge, deny, modify, or dissent to this testimony.
The only exceptions to these sales were those who re
j ected the offering price, and had Malin hold the seed fo
them for speculation. These individuals are named in Ap
pellant's brief, under Point 3 B, on Page 20. These transac
tions, as varying from the normal procedure testified to b;
Malin, were adduced on cross examination, (Tr. Pages 4:
to 50) and on Redirect by Counsel (Tr. 58 to 60).
It is also a fact that the price paid by Appellant forth~
seed which it received (Answer to Interrogatories R. P. 4!
to 52, Inc.) is the price stipulated to as the prices to b1
paid the growers (Tr. P. 76, lines 22 to 30; P. 77, lines J
to 4).
Throughout their brief, and particularly on Pages If
and 19, respondents state that the growers did not sell thei.J
seed, and didn't know it had been shipped, and quote a por
tion of Malin's testimony which they claim supports this
This position is not supported by the evidence. This linE
of questioning began on Page 28 of the Transcript, line 27
"Q. Now at the time, Mr. Malin, that thesE
farmers back in 1954, had delivered the seed to yot
and hadn't been paid for it. the one's that are suin~
here, weren't they periodically bothering you fo1
payment, and by 1955 and 1956, weren't they afte1
you to pay the 1954 shipments?
"A. It is a peculiar situation there. The mar·
ket was at a high point in '54, and then the marke1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

dropped in '55, and a lot of farmers-! mean, not
a lot of them, but most of the people that had seed
left over-generally knew how the market was going
and so forth and naturally we would talk about what
things were going on and what might happen.
"Q. In response to those discussions you told
them that their seed was in storage up in Burley,
didn't you?
"A. Not all of them.
"Q.

Many of them?"

Then follows the testimony quoted on Page 18, of respondents' brief.
We submit Malin was not talking of the Plaintiffs
generally, but only of those who had delivered the seed in
1954, and who asked him to hold the seed for a better price.
On Cross Examination, in order to identify just who,
among the many plaintiffs, were having Malin hold their
seed, Appellant's Counsel, pursued this inquiry further,
and had Malin identify each one (Tr. P. 40, line 29, and
continuing to Page 57, line 26, of the transcript). These
are the respondents named in Point 3 B, of Appellant's
brief, Page 20, who received a judgment against this Appellant.
Appellant's Counsel then pursued this line of questioning in Re-Direct (Tr. P. 58 and 59).
There is no evidence that any other grower delivered
his seed to Malin except for the purpose of immediate sale.
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HAMBLIN AND HUBER TRANSACTIONS
Respondents on Pages 38, and 39, refer to Hamblin an<
Huber transactions.
Hamblin received a draft in his own name on Novem.
ber 21, 1954, in the amount of $1500.00, as responden1
states. They have overlooked the fact that Hamblin late1
received and was paid an additional $200.00 by Malin'~
personal check in payment on this seed (Stipulated b~
Counsel-Tr. P. 83, lines 10-20).
Huber shipped two lots of seed in 1953, and 1954. One,
lot number 1552, was not subject of this suit. The other,
lot number 1670 was. In his Complaint, Mr. Huber pleaded
he had been paid approximately $1300.00 on lot 1670. By
stipulation, Counsel agreed that Huber had been paid a
total of $2,080.90, on these two lots. Counsel introduced
Exhibit R, to show the number of pounds of seed in lot
number 1552, as being 3664 pounds, of a value of 26c per
pound (Tr. Pages 84 and 85). The purchase price of lot
1552 was $952.64, which had been paid. The remainder,
$1128.26, the Court applied against lot number 1670, stipulated value of $1760.22, and arrived at a balance of $631.96.
Each example given by respondents in their brief, refers only to drafts. Yet the Trial Court found, and it is
supported by the evidence, and respondents have not challenged the finding, that Malin was directed upon purchase
to pay the full purchase for the seed upon sale either by
draft or personal check covered by a draft drawn to his
own order.
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Every payment in this case, except the draft to
Hamblin, was by Malin's personal check, excepting only
where the grower took merchandise from Malin in part
payment, such as Butcher Brothers (Tr. Pages 75 and 76).
Some of the original plaintiffs' action was dismissed
when the evidence showed they had been paid in full
by Malin's personal checks. Others have been paid substantial amounts by Malin's personal checks, all delivered
the seed to Malin for immediate sale except those discussed
in Point 3 B, of Appellant's brief, who held for speculation.
On Page 21, of respondents' brief, they say:
"It cannot be shown that Mr. Malin entered into
any transaction which was contrary to instructions
or authority which he had been given by Appellant,
except for the actual conversions in question."

And on Page 24, line 9, they say:
"Whatever arrangements he made, he made for
Appellant. Again, we repeat that there is absolutely
no evidence of any credit sale other than those arrangements which were fully understood, authorized
and approved by Appellant."
And on Page 30, in the middle of the page they say:
"He (Malin) had worked with Appellant over
a period of years and it obviously trusted him, but
more important to this case is that the deals he was
making were with its knowledge, approval and consent, and it held him out as it's agent to make the
deals."
These are strong statements and proof should be cited
if they are facts. I repeat, not a scintilla of evidence exists
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that Appellant knew, or could have known, that any grower
had not been paid in full when the seed was received at
Burley. Every shipment was covered by a draft for full
payment. Malin's authority, as the Court found, was to
make an advance before delivery if necessary, and "upon
agreement being reached, Malin had the authority from
Union Seed to close the sale; that Malin was directed to
pay the full purchase price for the seed to the grower by
draft on Union Seed Company, or by his personal check,
which personal check was covered by a draft drawn to himself on Union Seed Company" (Findings of Fact 15, R.
122).
In conclusion, and in response to Pages 36 and 37 of
respondents' brief, the transactions were not mere advances
on seed which Appellant hoped to buy. Every plaintiff
delivered an identifiable amount of seed, received a grade,
and price, and allowed and knew of the seed being shipped
to Appellant, in the same manner as their previous sales,
save only those who held for speculation. Every one who
did not receive full payment, made a credit sale, relying on
the agent only, because credit purchases were not authorized by the principal. The principal at all times kept the
agent in funds to pay in full as required by the law of
agency. See Mechem on Agency and Restatement of the
Law of Agency, quoted on Pages 11 and 15, of Appellant's
brief.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT F. SMART,
Attorney for Appellant.
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